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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Global Royalties, Ltd., a Canadian 




Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., an Arizona 
limited liability company d/b/a 
ripoffreport.com and/or 
badbusinessbureau.com; Ed Magedson and 




MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT
Global Royalties, Ltd. and Brandon Hall (collectively “Global Royalties” or 
“Plaintiffs”), hereby move the court to deny Defendants Xcentric Ventures L.L.C.’s 
(“Xcentric”) and Edward Magedson’s (“Magedson” and together with Xcentric 
“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.



























I. THE ALLEGED FACTS
The factual allegations of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) constitute the 
basis upon which Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) must be tested. The  
standard, as recently articulated by the Supreme Court, is:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 
need detailed factual allegations . . . , [its] [f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the 
assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007).  
The FAC alleges that Defendants Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C. and Ed Magedson 
operate an Internet website with the domain name “ripoffreport.com.” FAC ¶¶ 3 - 4. 
Defendants encourage visitors to the ripoffreport.com website to post numerous and 
repeated complaints about businesses or individuals.  FAC ¶ 11.  Those who post a 
complaint on the ripoffreport.com website must answer several questions created and 
developed by Xcentric and Magedson.  FAC ¶ 18. Those who post a complaint are also 
required to select a category under which to characterize the business or individual that is 
the subject of the complaint See FAC at ¶ 19.
On or about March 27, 2006, non-party Spencer Sullivan posted a statement on 
ripoffreport.com accusing Plaintiffs of operating a scam involving the sale of gem stones
(the “First Statement”).  FAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff Brandon Hall discovered the First Statement 
on May 15, 2006, when it was brought to his attention by a customer.  FAC ¶ 17.   
The First Statement was posted under a category titled “Con Artists” and thereby 
accused Plaintiffs of being “Con Artists” in addition to the accusations contained in the 
First Statement itself.  FAC ¶ 16.  Sullivan selected the “Con Artists” category from a list 
of available titles on the ripoffreport.com website.  FAC ¶ 19.  Xcentric and Magedson 
were solely responsible for the creation and development of the category titled “Con 



























Artists” and are thus responsible for the defamatory statement that Plaintiffs are “Con 
Artists.” FAC ¶¶ 20 - 21.  
The “Con Artists” label precedes the First Statement and also contaminates 
“Updates” posted under the First Statement.  On or about June 8, 2006, Sullivan posted an 
Update to the First Statement on ripoffreport.com in which he claimed that individuals 
associated with Plaintiffs were dishonorable and had engaged in criminal acts (the 
“Second Statement”).  FAC ¶ 22.  In addition, and among other things, Sullivan 
complained in the Second Statement that Plaintiffs (through counsel) had “threatened”
him with legal action and advised anyone considering doing business with Plaintiffs to 
first contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police  (“RCMP”) Commercial Crime Unit.  Id.
Spencer posted another Update on or about June 16, 2006 (the Third Statement”).  
FAC ¶ 23.  In the Third Statement, Sullivan stated that Plaintiffs (through counsel) had 
threatened him again and advised anyone considering doing business with Plaintiffs to 
first contact the RCMP.  Id.  Sullivan further stated that “I would think that any 
upstanding commercial operation could bear the scrutiny of a crime unit without any 
issue.”  Id.
At some point, Sullivan contacted the Defendants and asked them to remove his 
statements from the ripoffreport.com website, but Defendants refused.  FAC ¶ 25 - 26.  
(Plaintiffs contend, and will argue below, that Defendants’ refusal to take down the 
statements as requested by their original provider created a defining moment, at which
time the statements were no longer “provided” by a third party but, instead, became the 
statements of Xcentric and Magedson.)
Defendants had their own pecuniary interest in refusing to take down Spencer’s 
defamatory statements.  Through ripoffreport.com, they encourage visitors to post 
numerous and repeated complaints about businesses. FAC ¶ 11.  Defendants then use the 



























posted complaints as leverage to coerce businesses to pay to participate in Xcentric’s 
“Corporate Advocacy Program,” which purports to provide assistance in investigating and 
resolving posted complaints.  FAC ¶ 13.  Only after a business “enrolls” in the Corporate 
Advocacy Program will Defendants allegedly “verify” posted statements, determine their 
truthfulness and expose those that are posted “erroneously or maliciously.” FAC, Ex. 1, 
p. 3. The fees for “enrolling” in this program “are based upon the number of Reports 
filed, the number of offices you have, and/or the size of an average sale.”  Id.  There is 
also a flat “set-up fee” levied to offset the costs of programming and “contract legalities.”  
Id. It is an integral part of Ripoff’s “Corporate Advocacy Program” that “ALL reports, 
rebuttals and updates ever filed” remain posted on the ripoffreport.com website.  See id. at 
p. 6.
II. THE FIRST STATEMENT IS NOT TIME BARRED.
Xcentric’s defamatory statement - - that Global Royalties is a Con Artist - - was 
published in a manner likely to be concealed from Global Royalties.  Accordingly, the 
discovery rule applies in this case and the applicable statute of limitations was tolled until 
Global Royalties discovered or reasonably should have discovered Xcentric’s defamatory 
statement.
In Clark v. Airesearch Manu. Co. of Ariz., the court held that the discovery rule 
should be applied in those situations in which “the defamation is published in a manner in 
which it is peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff . . .” 138 Ariz. 240, 242, 
673 P.2d 984, 986 (App. 1983)  The court articulated this rule after considering the 
interplay between the policy behind statutes of limitations (to discourage the presentation 
of stale claims and to encourage diligence in the bringing of actions) and the need to 
preserve the injured party’s rights in limited cases where defamatory statements were 
likely to be kept secret from the plaintiff.  Id.  In the latter case, applying the discovery 



























rule is appropriate.  The case at bar involves one of those limited cases where Xcentric’s 
defamatory statement was likely to be kept secret from Global Royalties.
As Xcentric boasts, “Ripoff Report® is a worldwide consumer reporting Web site 
and publication, by consumers, for consumers to file and document complaints about 
companies or individuals.”  See FAC at ¶9.  The “service” Ripoff Report® purports to 
provide to consumers is the provision of information to be used by consumers in making a 
decision to do business with an entity or individual.  According to Xcentric, its reports are 
discovered by “millions of consumers” (emphasis added) who visit the site to search for or 
post complaints about a business or individual.  See FAC at ¶12.  Thus, as Xcentric 
intends, consumers wishing to inquire as to the integrity of a business or individual prior 
to doing business with them, or consumers seeking to complain about a business or 
individual after doing business with them are the members of the public who are likely to 
visit the site and discover its reports. 
On the other hand, the subject of a report is not likely to discover the report unless 
it constantly monitors the internet for that purpose or someone brings the report to the 
subject’s attention.  Reports posted on Xcentric’s website are likely to be kept secret from 
the unwitting subjects of those reports, unless, out of a sense of extreme paranoia, a 
business or individual regularly monitors the internet for the posting of information about 
them.  For this reason, the Court should conclude that the application of the discovery rule 
is appropriate here.
Global Royalties did not discover Xcentric’s defamatory statement until May 15, 
2006, when one of its customer’s brought the statement to its attention.  FAC at ¶17.  
Until that time the statement was concealed from Global Royalties and Global Royalties 
had no reason to believe that such a statement existed.  Under these circumstances, Global 
Royalties’ defamation claim is not time barred as far as the First Statement is concerned.



























Additionally, even if the First Statement was time barred, the Second and Third 
Statements published June 8, 2006 and June 16, 2006, respectively, remain and present 
viable defamation claims. Defendants do not repeat their earlier contentions that the 
Second Statement and Third Statement are not defamatory.  Perhaps this is so because
they know that now is not the time for such an argument.  It is well settled that the 
question whether the meaning conveyed by a statement is defamatory is a question for the 
jury.  Yetman v. English, 168 Ariz. 71, 79, 811 P.2d 323, 331 (1991); Dube v. Likins, 216 
Ariz. 406, 167 P.3d 93, 106 (Ct. App. 2007).  While it is a question of law for the court to 
determine whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning (see id.), the statements 
in issue here present sufficient fodder to reach the jury on the question whether they are, 
in fact, defamatory. 
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT DOES NOT BAR THE 
CLAIM.
A. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Immunity Under the Communications 
Decency Act, Because They Were Responsible, in Whole or in Part, for 
the Creation or Development of the Defamatory Content at Issue. 
In their effort to rely on the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230 et 
seq. (“CDA”), Defendants ignore certain Ninth Circuit precedents that deprive them of the 
immunity otherwise conferred by that Act.  
First, Defendants utterly ignore the Ninth Circuit’s most recent published CDA 
case,  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 489 F.3d 
921 (9th Cir. 2007). In Roommates, plaintiff sued the operator of an online roommate-
matching website, alleging that the operator violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and 
other state laws.  The plaintiff complained that the operator of the website violated the 
FHA by (1) posting questionnaires on its website and requiring individuals who wanted to 
take advantage of its services to complete them; (2) posting and distributing by email its 



























members’ profiles and (3) posting information its members provided on a form entitled 
“Additional Comments.”  Id. at 926.  In reviewing the trial court’s granting of the 
operator’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity under the CDA, the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether by engaging in the above-referenced activity, the 
operator was “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of [the] 
information.” In other words, the court sought to determine whether the operator was an 
information content provider and, accordingly, not entitled to immunity under the CDA.
The court answered this question in the affirmative.
The CDA affords providers of interactive computer services immunity from 
liability for content created by third parties.  Roommates 489 F.3d at 925; see also 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); and Batzel v. Smith, 
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Critically, however, §230 limits immunity to information 
‘provided by another information content provider.’“) An information content provider is 
defined to mean any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
creation or development of information provided through the internet or any other 
interactive computer service.  Roommates, 489 F.3d at 925.  In concluding that the 
operator was an information content provider who was not entitled to CDA immunity, the 
Roommates court found that the operator’s responsibility for creating or developing the 
forms of and answer choices for the questionnaires complained of to be the salient factor. 
489 F.3d at 926.
Likewise, Defendants are responsible for the creation or development of the 
defamatory content.  The defamatory content complained of in the FAC is Xcentric’s 
statement that Global Royalties is a “Con Artist.”  It is beyond dispute that as to this 
content, Xcentric is responsible for its creation and development.  Individuals who post a 
complaint on Xcentric’s ripoffreport.com website must answer several questions created 



























and developed by Defendants.  FAC at ¶18.  Additionally, individuals who post a 
complaint on Xcentric’s ripoffreport.com website are required to select a category under 
which to identify the business entity or individual about whom the complaint is posted.  
See FAC at ¶19.  Among the categories available to those posting on Xcentric’s website is 
the category “Con Artists” which was created solely by Defendants.  Thus, when Sullivan 
selected the “Con Artists” category, Defendants became responsible, in whole or in part, 
for the defamatory content contained in the First Statement and, thereafter, the Second and 
Third Statements which were also contaminated by the “Con Artists” label.  
Consequently, the CDA does not afford immunity to the Defendants because they were 
information content providers.
Second, while Defendants do cite and rely on Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 
339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), they ignore the fact that the Roommates court determined 
that Carafano would not control in a situation -- as alleged in this case -- in which the 
website operator “actively encourage[s], solicit[s] and profit[s] from the tortious and 
unlawful communications of others.” 489 F.3d at 928.
After concluding that the operator was an information content provider, the 
Roommates court considered whether the CDA would exempt the operator from liability 
for publishing and distributing member profiles that were generated from the members’
answers to the operator’s questionnaires.  The court rejected the operator’s argument that 
Carafano settled the issue, finding Carafano to be distinguishable on the basis of a 
significant factor: the third-party that provided the defamatory content in Carafano was 
not solicited to do so by the operator of the website.  Id.  The operator, on the other hand, 
solicited the very information complained of as violating the FHA.  As the court stated: 
“We are not convinced that Carafano would control in a situation where defamatory, 



























private or otherwise tortious or unlawful information was provided by users in direct 
response to questions and prompts from the operator of the website.”  Id.  
To illustrate its point, the Roommates court posed a hypothetical in which a website 
operator - - www.harrassthem.com - - encouraged its visitors to provide sensitive and / or 
defamatory information about others to be posted online for a fee.  In addition, the visitor 
would be encouraged by the operator to post dirt on a victim without regard to its 
truthfulness or accuracy.  Ibid.  Under these circumstances, the court doubted whether 
Carafano would protect the hypothetical website operator.  Because the operator could be 
considered to have been responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation of the content, by 
virtue of its providing a forum designed to publish the defamatory information, the CDA 
would not provide immunity.  In this regard the Roommates court wrote:
“Carafano did not consider whether the CDA protected such websites, and 
we do not read that opinion as granting CDA immunity to those who 
actively encourage, solicit and profit from the tortious and unlawful 
communications of others.”  
Id.  In other words, where the website operator encourages, solicits and profits from the 
tortious and unlawful communications of others, Carafano cannot be relied on as 
authority for the application of CDA immunity.
Like the www.harrassthem.com operator, Xcentric and Magedson actively solicited
Sullivan to characterize Global Royalties as “Con Artists.” Additionally, like the 
hypothetical www.harrassthem.com operator, Xcentric and Magedson seek to profit from 
the posting of defamatory information about business entities or individuals.  Defendants 
use the posted complaints as leverage to coerce businesses to pay to participate in 
Xcentric’s “Corporate Advocacy Program,” which purports to provide assistance in 
investigating and resolving posted complaints.  See FAC at ¶13.  



























Based on the foregoing, Defendants would not be entitled to immunity under the 
CDA.  Defendants were information content providers for whom immunity is not granted 
by the statute.  
B. Consistent with the Logic of Batzel, Defendants’ Refusal  of Spencer’s 
Direction to Take Down His Postings Should Deprive Defendants of 
CDA Immunity.
Another, and independent, reason why Defendants are not entitled to CDA 
immunity is that they refused to take down the statements in issue after they were 
requested to do so by the very person who posted them. Defendants disregard an aspect of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Batzel, by logical extension, would deny CDA immunity in 
such a circumstance.   
In Batzel, Smith undertook a computer search for websites concerning stolen art 
work and thus located the Museum Security Network (the “Network”) website.  He then 
sent an email to the Network claiming that Batzel was a descendant of “one of Adolph 
Hitler’s right-hand men” and that she had inherited stolen art that was looted during 
World War II.  333 F.3d at 1021.  The sole operator of the Network was Cremers, who 
posted Smith’s email message on the website.  Id. at 1022.  Batzel sued Smith and 
Cremers for defamation.
In our case, Defendants rely on an earlier portion of the Batzel opinion.  They rely 
on the court’s conclusion that Cremers’s minor alterations of Smith’s email prior to its 
posting and his selection of it for posting on the Network website would not make him the 
“provider” of the challenged content and thus would not deprive him of CDA protection.  
But, the opinion does not stop there.  To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit continued:
In most cases our conclusion that Cremers cannot be considered a 
content provider would end matters, but this case presents one twist on the 
usual § 230 analysis: Smith maintains that he never “imagined [his] message 
would be posted on an international message board or [he] never would 
have sent it in the first place.” The question thus becomes whether Smith 



























can be said to have “provided” his e-mail in the sense intended by § 230.  If 
the defamatory information is not “provided by another information content 
provider,” then § 230 does not confer immunity on the publisher of the 
information.
Id. at 1032 (emphasis in original).  To be “provided” in the sense required for CDA 
immunity, the third-party information must be “provided for use on the Internet or another 
interactive computer service.”  Id. at 1033 (emphasis in original).  
Cremers argued that it was irrelevant that Smith did not intend his message to be 
posted on the website because “the § 230(c)(1) immunity should be available simply 
because Smith was the author of the e-mail, without more.”  Id. The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed.  Id.  The court rejected Cremers’s argument because it concluded that such a 
broad interpretation of CDA immunity was not consistent with Congress’s expressly 
stated purposes in adopting § 230:
Free speech and the development of the Internet are not “promote[d]” by 
affording immunity when providers and users of “interactive computer 
service[s]” knew or had reason to know that the information provided was 
not intended for publication on the Internet.
Id. at 1033-34.  Indeed, the Batzel court concluded that immunizing computer service 
providers or users from liability for content they know or have reason to know is not 
intended for publication:
[I]nterferes with Congress’s objective of providing incentives for providers 
and users of interactive computer services to remove offensive material, 
especially obscene and defamatory speech.  Far from encouraging such 
actions, immunizing a publisher or distributor for including content not 
intended for Internet publication increases the likelihood that obscene and 
defamatory material will be widely available.
Id. at 1034.  
Relying on this policy analysis, the Batzel court held that a service provider or user 
(such as ripoffreport.com) qualifies for immunity under § 230(c)(1) only when the third 
party furnished the information in question “under circumstances in which a reasonable 
person in the position of the service provider or user would conclude that the information 



























was provided for publication on the Internet or other ‘interactive computer service.’“  Id.  
In Batzel, the third party (Smith) provided the content, but allegedly never meant 
for it to be published on the defendant’s website.  In our case, the third party (Spencer)
originally provided the content for publication, but later directed that it be taken down and 
published no more.  Defendants refused.  All of the policy reasons considered by the 
Ninth Circuit in Batzel apply equally in this case to deny CDA immunity to a website 
operator that refuses to accede to a direction -- made by the original content provider --
that his content be taken down.  In neither case is the content intended (or any longer 
intended) for publication.  Therefore, under Batzel, the consequence of refusing that 
request should be loss of CDA immunity.  Accord see Carafano, supra, 339 F.3d at 1124 
(noting that § 230 immunity applies “so long as a third party willingly provides the 
essential published content”) (emphasis added).  
Giving effect to this logical extension of the Batzel court’s holding is not 
inconsistent with Universal Communication Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st 
Cir. 2007), and Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  In its 
October 10, 2007 Order, this Court cited Universal for the proposition that notice of the 
unlawful nature of third party content is not enough to make it the website operator’s own 
speech.  (Doc. # 20 at 5:6-9.)  And, Zeran was cited for the proposition that a defendant’s 
failure to remove challenged content is an exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
functions and does not defeat CDA immunity.  (Doc. # 20 at 5:12-14.)  But, the facts in 
those cases were different.
As far as the reported opinions disclose, there was no demand by the original 
content provider in either Universal or Zeran that the challenged content be taken down.  
In fact, in Zeran, it is clear that the demand for removal was made by the defamed 
plaintiff (129 F.3d at 329), rather than the unidentified (and apparently unidentifiable) 



























content provider.  This is a significant factual difference that logically leads to a different 
legal result in terms of the policies that the CDA was intended to foster.  In Zeran, the 
Fourth Circuit was concerned that, if computer service providers faced potential liability 
each time they received notice of a potentially defamatory statement  -- “from any party
concerning any message” -- they would confront the prospect of having to make “a careful 
yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal 
judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial 
decision” whether to risk liability by continuing to publish the information.  129 F.3d at 
333 (emphasis added).  Given the risks involved, the Zeran court was concerned that there 
would be a natural incentive to remove the information upon notification, whether the 
contents were defamatory or not, and thus a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet 
speech.  Id.
Significantly, none of these problems arise when CDA immunity is denied  to 
website operators who refuse a request by the original provider of the challenged content 
to take it down.  In that limited circumstance, the website operator is not “caught in the 
middle” with the Herculean job of attempting to make a legal judgment call on the 
veracity of someone else’s content in the blink of an eye.  In that limited circumstance, 
there is no “middle” in which to be caught; the speaker has simply withdrawn his speech.  
In any event, in Batzel, the Ninth Circuit clearly held that CDA immunity is 
available only when a third party content provider furnishes information “under 
circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position of the service provider or user 
would conclude that the information was provided for publication on the Internet or other 
‘interactive computer service’.” 333 F.3d at 1034.  When a website operator is directed 
by the very provider of posted content to remove it from the website, the website operator 
is on notice that publication is no longer intended.  Thus, under the allegations in this 



























case, defendants’ denial of Spencer’s request that his statements be withdrawn from 
publication should deprive Defendants of CDA immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Roommates, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the CDA would not necessarily 
shield website operators that “actively encourage, solicit and profit from the tortious and 
unlawful communications of others.” 489 F.3d at 928.  The factual allegations here 
present just such a case.  Here, Defendants do not act as a neutral purveyor of content on 
the Internet.  Instead, their profiteering motive prompts them to encourage the posting of 
defamatory statements by others and motivates their refusal to take such statements down 
when the original provider no longer intends for them to be published.  For these, and the 
other reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
If, however, the Court determines to grant Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs request 
that the Court make clear in its order that the ruling is not intended to have res judicata
effect upon Plaintiffs’ future suit seeking recognition and enforcement of a final judgment 
it obtains in its prior action filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Case No. 06-
CV-315577PD2, upon conclusion of the trial on damages in that Canadian action.  
Previously, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim seeking enforcement of a liability order 
entered in the Canadian action on the ground that the order was not final.  Once the 
Canadian action is reduced to a final judgment on both liability and damages, it would be 
unduly prejudicial to preclude Plaintiffs from seeking its enforcement here on the basis of 
res judicata.  Alternatively, Plaintiffs should be permitted to seek a stay of this action 
(including a ruling on Defendants’ motion) pending entry of final judgment in the 
Canadian action and pending further order of this Court.



























RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of November, 2007.
QUARLES & BRADY STREICH LANG LLP
Renaissance One
Two North Central Avenue
Phoenix, AZ  85004-2391
By s/André H. Merrett   
André H. Merrett
Deana S. Peck
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Global Royalties, Ltd. 
and Brandon Hall
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